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WHEN IT COMES TO ORDERS OF
PROTECTION AND GUNS – LANGUAGE
MATTERS
HOW ORDERS OF PROTECTION IN TENNESSEE
MAY NOT BE EFFECTIVELY IMPOSING THE STATE
AND FEDERAL FIREARMS BANS

Joshua M. Anderson1
I. INTRODUCTION
Crime statistics show that there are over 2,000
firearm-related domestic violence incidents in Tennessee
every year.2 In recognition of the threat that firearms pose to
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2 TENNESSEE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2018 (2019),
https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/tbi/documents/tibrs/2018%20Domestic
%20Violence_Final.pdf; TENNESSEE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE 2017 (2018), https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/tbi/documents/
tibrs/Domestic%20Violence%202017_Final.pdf; TENNESSEE BUREAU OF
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victims of domestic violence, both Congress and the
Tennessee General Assembly have enacted firearm bans on
individuals that have orders of protection entered against
them.3
For the restrictions to apply, however, certain
findings and orders must be explicitly in the order of
protection, and certain procedures must be followed. 4 The
restrictions also do not apply in all cases: only those
involving “intimate partners” as defined by federal law.5 In
at least one instance in Tennessee, a lack of adherence to
these statutes led to a reversal of conviction on appeal.6
It is imperative that judges enter orders of protection
that carefully track the statutory language.7 Tennessee’s
court forms should be adapted to serve as a useful tool for
this purpose and to ensure compliance on the part of all
parties. This article will briefly examine the order of
protection firearms restrictions, note some important points
to consider in practice, and advocate for reformation of
Tennessee order of protection forms to meet the applicable
standards.

II. TENNESSEE FIREARMS RESTRICTIONS
Tennessee’s firearm restrictions for orders of
protection are really just the federal restrictions. Tennessee
Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(f) makes it a Class A
misdemeanor8 for an individual that is “subject to an order
of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)”
to possess a firearm.9 The main takeaway from this provision
is that the text of the statute does not say “substantially
INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2016 (2017), https://www.tn.gov/
content/dam/tn/tbi/documents/Domestic_Violence_2016_final2.pdf.
3 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1307(f) (2021).
4 Id.
5 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2021); 18 U.S.C. § 921(32) (2021) (defining the term
“intimate partner”).
6 State v. Carman-Thacker, No. M2014-01859-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 Tenn.
Crim. App. LEXIS 728, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015).
7 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2021).
8 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1307(f)(4) (2021).
9 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1307(f)(1)(B) (2021).
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complies,” it says “fully complies,” meaning each element of
the federal statute must be met.10
Tennessee courts have interpreted this requirement
literally.11 The Court of Appeals in Long v. Brown held that
an order of protection did not fully comply with the Federal
law when it did not include the specific federal statutory
language.12 The order did not restrain the respondent as
prescribed by law or have the required findings on its face.13

III. FEDERAL FIREARMS RESTRICTIONS
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) makes it a crime for anyone that
is subject to a court order meeting the statute’s requirements
from possessing a firearm.
Importantly, the ban is only applicable to orders that
restrain an individual’s conduct towards an “intimate
partner.”14 An “intimate partner” is defined for purposes of
this statute as:
with respect to a person, the spouse of the
person, a former spouse of the person, an
individual who is a parent of a child of the
person, and an individual who cohabitates or
has cohabited with the person.15
“Intimate partner” is notably narrower than the
“domestic abuse victim”16 that is permitted to seek an order
of protection under Tennessee law.17 Even more importantly,
“intimate partner” does not categorically encompass the even
broader “stalking victim” or “sexual assault victim” that may
seek an order of protection in Tennessee. 18 As such, in many
Tennessee cases, the firearm restrictions are not applicable
See Long v. Brown, No. E2013-00802-COA-R3-CV, 2014 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 29, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014).
11 Id.; Carman-Thacker, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 728 at *20.
12 Brown, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29 at *20.
13 Id.
14 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2021).
15 18 U.S.C. § 921(32) (2021).
16 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(5) (2021).
17 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-602(a) (2021).
18 Id.
10
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because the parties are not “intimate partners” as defined by
federal law.
For the restrictions to be applicable, the order must
have been “issued after a hearing of which [the respondent]
received actual notice, and at which [the respondent] had an
opportunity to participate . . . .” 19 The requirement of notice
and hearing with an opportunity to be heard is why the
firearms ban is not applicable for ex parte orders of
protection – which are issued at the initiation of a petition
and prior to a full hearing.20
The federal statute also requires the terms of the
order to include several explicit findings and restrictions.21
An order of protection must:
include a finding that the person it is entered
against “represents a credible threat to the
physical safety of such intimate partner or
child . . . ”22
restrain the person from “harassing, stalking,
or threatening an intimate partner of such
person or child of such intimate partner or
person, or engaging in other conduct that
would place an intimate partner in reasonable
fear of bodily injury to the partner or child . . .
”23
“by its terms explicitly prohibits the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against such intimate partner or child
that would reasonably be expected to cause
bodily injury . . . .” 24

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A) (2021).
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605 (2021).
21 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2021).
22 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) (2021).
23 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(B) (2021).
24 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) (2021).
19
20
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If these requirements are met by the order of protection, then
the federal firearms ban (and thus the state ban) is effective
against the respondent.

IV. TENNESSEE DISPOSSESSION AND DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
Upon the issuance of an order of protection that
effectuates the firearms restrictions, the respondent has
forty-eight (48) hours to dispossess themselves of any
firearms in their possession “by any lawful means.” 25 They
also must complete an “affidavit of firearms dispossession,”
attesting that they have complied with this requirement.26
Knowingly failing to dispossess a firearm is itself a crime,
punishable as a Class A misdemeanor for each violation.27
An order of protection is required to specifically order
and instruct a respondent about dispossession of firearms.28
Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-625(b) provides that the
court must order the respondent:
To terminate the respondent’s physical
possession of the firearms in the respondent's
possession by any lawful means, such as
transferring possession to a third party who is
not prohibited from possessing firearms,
within forty-eight (48) hours;
To complete and return the affidavit of firearm
dispossession form created pursuant to
subsection (e), which the court may provide
the respondent or direct the respondent to the
administrative office of the courts' website;
and
That if the respondent possesses firearms as
business inventory or that are registered
under the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. §§
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-625(b)(1) (2021).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-625(d) (2021).
27 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-113(h)(1) (2021).
28 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-625(b) (2021).
25
26
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5801 et seq.), there are additional statutory
provisions that may apply and shall include
these additional provisions in the content of
the order.

Additionally, if the order meets the standards of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8), the order on its face must provide the respondent
with disclosures set out in the statute informing them about
the dispossession, the prohibition of possessing a firearm,
and that possessing a firearm or failing to dispossess of one
is a violation of the law.29
Recognizing the importance of respondents receiving
disclosures about restrictions before their hearing, the
General Assembly specifically required that the
administrative office of the courts include disclosures in their
promulgated petition for an order of protection form.30 The
petition must include language that is “substantially
similar” to that which is provided in the statute itself.31

V. FAILURE TO ADHERE TO STATUTORY LANGUAGE LEADS
TO INEFFECTIVE ORDERS OF PROTECTION
In State v. Carman-Thacker, the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed a conviction of twelve counts of
unlawful possession of a firearm and twelve counts of
violating an order of protection, when the underlying order
did not meet the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).32 The
defendant, in that case, had an order of protection entered
against her that had been brought by her niece.33 The order
of protection did contain “‘subtitles’ that prohibited her from
possessing firearms.”34 However, the court concluded that a
niece, who had not cohabitated with the defendant, was not
an “intimate partner” for purposes of the federal statute.35

TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-625(a) (2021).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(c) (2021).
31 Id.
32 Carman-Thacker, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 728 at *19-20.
33 Id. at *19.
34 Id. at *7.
35 Id. at *19-20.
29
30
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The court vacated the convictions and dismissed all
charges.36
In Long v. Brown, the respondent attacked an order
of protection entered against him on various grounds,
including that the disclosures of Tennessee Code Annotated
§ 36-3-625(a) were not in the order.37 The appellate court
concluded that the disclosures were not required because the
order of protection did not fully comply with the provisions
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).38
These two cases illustrate the importance of making
sure that the proper findings and other requirements are met
in an order of protection – otherwise the order is wholly
ineffective in prohibiting applicable respondents from
possessing firearms. Lack of accuracy leads to costly,
needless litigation, as in Long v. Brown,39 or a defendant who
otherwise would have been successfully convicted for
violating an order of protection, instead going without
consequence, as in State v. Carman-Thacker.
This should also serve as a harbinger for cases in
which a petitioner and respondent seek an agreed order with
no findings of facts or only certain restrictions provided for
in the order. If it is the parties’ or court’s intent that the
firearm restrictions be in effect, the order must still meet the
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) – otherwise, the ban is
not applicable. This also highlights an even larger problem
that is outside the scope of this article, as orders of protection
must meet certain requirements and contain certain findings
to be generally effective at all.40

Id. at *20.
Brown, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29 at *19-20.
38 Id. at *20.
39 A case that, interesting enough, the petitioner would likely have been
an “intimate partner” and otherwise met the requirements of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8) if the facial requirements were met in the order. See CarmanThacker, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 728 at *1 (the petitioner was “the
man with whom [respondent] had lived for approximately 27 years”).
40 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-113(f) (2021).
36
37
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VI. TENNESSEE NEEDS TO MODIFY ITS ORDER OF
PROTECTION FORM
The Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts
promulgates a variety of forms that may be used in order of
protection cases.41 This is done, admirably, to assist local
clerks of court in their duty to provide forms to petitioners
necessary to seek an order of protection42 and for the Office
to meet its statutory requirements,43 including those relating
to firearm restrictions.44 Notably, several local courts use
their own forms,45 though state law requires that the forms
provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts be used
exclusively by all courts.46
The state order of protection form, as it is
promulgated at the date of this publication, does not meet all
the facial requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) necessary to
effectuate the firearms ban.47 The form does a good job of
clearly defining the relationship of the petitioner and
respondent for purposes of the “intimate partner”
determination.48 The form includes a default finding that the
“Respondent was given reasonable notice of the hearing and
an opportunity to be heard,”49 seemingly meeting the
requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A), ‒ though it deviates
from the term “actual notice” in the federal statute. 50 The
form also includes another default finding that “there is
credible evidence that Respondent is a threat to the safety of
the Petitioner and [] Petitioner’s Minor Children.”51 This
See TENNESSEE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ORDER OF
PROTECTION FORMS, https://www.tncourts.gov/programs/self-help-center/
forms/order-protection-forms (last visited December 11, 2020).
42 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(a) (2021).
43 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(b) (2021).
44 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(c) (2021).
45 The author is aware that at least Knox County and Davidson County
Courts currently use their own forms.
46 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(d) (2021).
47 See TENNESSEE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, FORM #OP20187 (07/01/19), http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/docs/order_of_
protection_7.1.2019.pdf (last visited December 11, 2020).
48 TENNESSEE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURT, supra note 46, at 1.
49 TENNESSEE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURT, supra note 46, at 2.
50 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A) (2021).
51 TENNESSEE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURT, supra note 46, at 2.
41
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seeks to fulfill the requirements of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8)(C)(i), though it does not use the exact language
“represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such
intimate partner or child.”52
Notably absent from the order of protection form are
the explicit orders that restrain the person from “harassing,
stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person
or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in
other conduct that would place an intimate partner in
reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child . . . .” 53
The order form’s terms also do not explicitly prohibit "the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably
be expected to cause bodily injury . . . .” 54
While the Sixth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion,
indicated that more broad terms like “abuse” might satisfy
some of the above requirements,55 other courts have taken a
more literal approach.56 The New Hampshire Supreme Court
in Magoon v. Thoroughgood held that when a trial court did
not use the “explicit” language provided for in 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8) ‒ which in contrast was used in New Hampshire’s
state domestic violence form – the trial court erred in barring
the respondent from being returned his firearms.57
While one might speculate how Tennessee courts or
federal courts might interpret Tennessee’s form provisions
and whether they meet the federal standards, it is also
important for purposes of full faith and credit to consider how
other states might construe them. This is an idea that did
not pass by the General Assembly which admonished the
Administrative Office of the Courts that “[t]o the extent
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) (2021)(emphasis added).
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(B) (2021).
54 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) (2021).
55 United States v. Hopper, 28 F. App’x 376, 379 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Although
‘domestic violence and abuse’ is language which may contemplate a
broader range of activity than physical assault, we believe that the
language is sufficiently explicit so as to include actual, attempted and
threatened physical force within its meaning.”)
56 Magoon v. Thoroughgood, 148 N.H. 139 (N.H. 2002).
57 Id. at 143.
52
53
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possible, the forms shall be uniform with those promulgated
by surrounding states so that Tennessee forms may be
afforded full faith and credit.”58 Other states currently have
order of protection forms that track the federal statutory
language exactly.59
For Tennessee courts to ensure that applicable orders
of protection effectuate the state/federal firearms ban on
respondents and to ensure other states give full faith and
credit to these orders, the Tennessee Administrative of the
Courts should modify its order of protection form to track the
exact language provided for in the federal statutes. The
Tennessee judiciary should also require that all local courts
abide by the requirement60 that they use these uniform state
forms in practice.

VII. CONCLUSION
When it comes to the state and federal firearms bans
– it matters what language is used in the findings,
restrictions, and other terms of an order of protection. 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) provides specific requirements of what an
order must include, and it narrowly defines who such an
order applies against.61 Judges and practitioners should pay
close attention to what is written, check marked, and
included in a form order of protection. The Tennessee
Administrative Office of the Courts should also modify
Tennessee’s forms to ensure they are a useful tool in this
practice.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(b) (2021).
See, e.g., GA. SUPER. CT. CLERKS' COOP. AUTH., FAMILY VIOLENCE TWELVE
MONTH PROTECTIVE ORDER ADDED - 09/18/2014, https://www.gsccca.org/
docs/familyviolencedocuments/sc16_family_violence_twelve_month_prote
ctive_order.pdf?sfvrsn=c27bca28_2 (last visited December 11, 2020).
60 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(d) (2021).
61 See also 18 U.S.C. § 921(32) (2021).
58
59

